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Abstract: 
We evaluated the extent to which memory test format and test transfer influence the dynamics of 
metacognitive judgments. Participants completed two study-test phases for paired-associates, 
with or without transferring test type, in one of four conditions: (1) recognition then recall, (2) 
recall then recognition, (3) recognition throughout, or (4) recall throughout. Global judgments 
were made prestudy, poststudy, and posttest for each phase; judgments of learning (JOLs) 
following item study were also collected. Results suggest that metacognitive judgment accuracy 
varies substantially by memory test type. Whereas underconfidence in JOLs and global 
predictions increases with recall practice (Koriat’s underconfidence-with-practice effect), 
underconfidence decreases with recognition practice. Moreover, performance changes when 
transferring test type were not fully anticipated by pretest judgments. 
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In recent years, increased attention has been paid to the processes involved in the metacognitive 
monitoring of memory encoding and retrieval. The accurate monitoring of memory processes 
can support control behavior which leads to more efficient and effective learning outcomes (see 
Nelson & Narens, 1990). However, a number of systematic distortions have been found in the 
accuracy of memory monitoring for forecasting memory performance (e.g., Benjamin, Bjork, & 
Schwartz, 1998; Koriat & Bjork, 2005, 2006). Koriat (1997) advocates a perspective that relates 
metamemory accuracy to the cues that are used to make metacognitive judgments. In some cases, 
individuals use cues that are not diagnostic of subsequent performance, such as the fluency 
(speed and ease) of retrieval and encoding ( Benjamin et al., 1998; Hertzog, Dunlosky, Kidder, & 
Robinson, 2003). In other cases, valid cues are ignored or discounted. For example, individuals 
do not distinguish between forward versus backward associative strength (e.g., in a free-
association task, the word “kittens” elicits “cats” but the word “cats” does not as readily elicit 
“kittens”) when they make judgments of learning (JOLs) for items differing in this characteristic, 
despite major influences of this cue on recall ( Koriat & Bjork, 2005). 
It is some consolation, then, that metacognitive judgment accuracy can improve over practice 
with multiple study-test phases. Such improvements might largely be based on opportunities to 
benefit from test experience ( Finn & Metcalfe, 2007; Hertzog, Dixon, & Hultsch, 1990; 
Hertzog, Price, & Dunlosky, 2008; Koriat & Bjork, 2006). Despite this, distortions in monitoring 
can also accompany memory task experience. Koriat and colleagues have uncovered an 
interesting regularity in the dynamics of monitoring cued-recall accuracy ( Koriat, 1997; Koriat, 
Sheffer, & Ma’ayan, 2002; Koriat, Ma’ayan, Sheffer, & Bjork, 2006). When making JOLs, 
individuals typically do not anticipate future performance gains due to learning. That is, 
monitoring learning is underconfident, in the sense that mean JOL confidence becomes lower 
than the actual level of cued recall. The effect is also observed for global predictions, in which 
individuals give a single number predicting how many (or what percentage) of items they will 
remember ( Koriat et al., 2002). The absolute accuracy of JOLs (often scaled as the difference 
score, mean JOL – mean recall) can be relatively good on an initial study-test phase, often 
exhibiting modest overconfidence. However, it becomes substantially underconfident on a 
second study-test phase, and thereafter (see also Meeter & Nelson, 2003; Scheck & Nelson, 
2005; Serra & Dunlosky, 2005). This underconfidence-with-practice (UWP) effect is particularly 
intriguing given that practice generally improves the resolution (i.e., relative accuracy or item-
by-item discriminability) of JOLs at the same time it negatively affects their absolute accuracy ( 
Connor, Dunlosky, & Hertzog, 1997; Finn & Metcalfe, 2007; Koriat, 1997). Since learning 
outside the laboratory often involves multiple exposures to material (e.g., reading before class 
and listening during lecture), understanding the dynamics of subjective learning and their impact 
on subsequent behavior is particularly important. 
It is notable that previous work demonstrating UWP has exclusively relied on cued-recall tests in 
multiple study-test phases. Metamemory accuracy can vary markedly for different test types. 
People appear to know that recognition is normatively easier than recall, resulting in higher 
memory performance with recognition testing than with recall testing ( Thiede, 1996). Indeed, 
test expectancy has been shown to impact learning behavior, such that participants who 
anticipate a recall test use encoding strategies that benefit both recall and recognition tests ( 
Neely & Balota, 1981). However, participants may not always consider test type differences 
when forecasting performance. For example, Mazzoni and Cornoldi (1993) found that JOLs did 
not vary when participants anticipated a recall test versus a recognition test, even though more 
study time was allocated when anticipating a recall test. 
Manipulation of test type might also moderate the UWP effect. In a skill acquisition task that 
demands hundreds of associative recognition tests (the noun-pair learning task), we ( Hertzog, 
Touron, & Hines, 2007; Touron & Hertzog, 2004a, 2004b; Touron, Swaim, & Hertzog, 2007) 
have regularly obtained substantial overconfidence at the end of practice in JOLs for cued recall, 
a task we administered to measure learning of the associations after extensive experience with 
the noun pairs, and after associative recognition tests that are part of our noun-pair test 
procedure. For example, Touron and Hertzog (2004b) found that both young and older adults’ 
associative recognition performance after extended practice was excellent (over 93% correct 
after 60 repetitions per stimulus pair). When participants were then given a cued-recall test, 
recall performance was lower than recognition (87% for young and 64% for old). However, 
mean JOLs for cued recall were overconfident (91% for young and 77% for old), showing no 
UWP effect. JOLs were not simply reflecting levels of prior recognition performance – both age 
groups predicted lower recall than the level of recognition performance they achieved at the end 
of practice. Nevertheless, the extended recognition performance experience in the noun-pair task 
did not produce UWP upon transfer to a cued-recall test. This outcome implies that the learning 
history resulting from a particular type of memory test format may influence how memory 
confidence changes with learning. 
In fact, test type and test transfer differences in the UWP effect might be anticipated from 
various theoretical approaches to metacognition. Koriat’s cue-utilization perspective (1997), as 
noted above, proposes that the accuracy of metamemory judgments is related to the use of 
effective cues. Prior research from this perspective indicates that metacognitive judgments focus 
on intrinsic cues (i.e., stimulus characteristics), such as the degree of semantic relatedness 
between paired-associates, and may discount extrinsic cues (i.e., learning conditions), such as 
test type and baseline or chance performance (see Koriat, 1997; Koriat & Bjork, 2006). We 
might also anticipate that UWP would be impacted by test type based on the memory-for-past-
test (MPT) heuristic ( Finn & Metcalfe, 2007, 2008), which assumes that JOLs are more 
informed by prior test performance levels than by monitoring during study or by theory-based 
expectations (such as those resulting from instructed test type). From this perspective, low 
accuracy in a recall test might be expected to lead to more underconfident JOLs in future study 
phases (a typical UWP outcome), whereas high accuracy in a recognition test might be expected 
to lead to less underconfident JOLs in future study phases. 
Differences in subjective learning or UWP across test formats and test transfer could have 
important implications outside the laboratory. For example, student learning might involve self-
assessment primarily via recognition when re-reading and studying class materials, which could 
create illusory overconfidence relative to an examination format that involves cued recall (such 
as short answer essays). Test format is likely to vary for a given concept across multiple 
occasions such as informal queries in the classroom, short quizzes, student self-assessment, and 
final examinations; tailoring study to anticipate such variability could be an important 
component of successful preparation. 
Although understanding UWP most critically involves changes in the absolute accuracy of 
monitoring judgments, it is worth noting that the resolution of monitoring accuracy also varies 
by test type. Thiede and Dunlosky (1994) obtained higher relative accuracy for JOLs with recall 
testing compared to recognition testing, regardless of test anticipation or cue type, partially due 
to correct guessing. This outcome is consistent with meta-analytic findings by Schwartz and 
Metcalfe (1994) showing that the relative accuracy of feeling-of-knowing judgments depends in 
large part on the number of test alternatives used, with unreliable judgments in two-choice 
recognition, but more reliable judgments for recall tests. Weaver and Kelemen (2003) also 
showed substantially lower relative and absolute accuracy of delayed JOLs in recognition 
memory tasks, although the test type effect varied for different types of JOLs. 
The present work examined two primary questions: (1) how are changes in metacognitive 
monitoring accuracy impacted by differences in memory test type and (2) how are changes in 
metacognitive monitoring accuracy impacted when the type of memory test is changed. The 
design involved persons either experiencing two phases of the same test procedure (recognition 
or recall) or being transferred from one test format to the other. Although previous work 
examining changes in monitoring accuracy has generally focused on judgments at study, we also 
examined judgments at test in the current study as well as global judgments at other periods 
during the study-test interval. We used multiple different metacognitive judgments in order to 
clarify the point in the phase of study-test experiences where UWP effects emerged (see Hertzog 
& Dunlosky, 2004; Hertzog et al., 2008, for broader theoretical discussions of how placement of 
metacognitive judgments relates to inferences about different kinds of monitoring and their 
influence on generating new knowledge about effective encoding and retrieval strategies). 
First, we compared recognition testing and recall test conditions as to what extent changes in 
memory accuracy are reflected in changes in item judgments (immediate JOLs at study and 
confidence judgments [CJs] at test) and global judgments (performance prestudy and poststudy 
predictions as well as postdictions after the test). Global postdictions and predictions require 
inferential processes about how to translate item-specific experiences with memory successes 
and failures (as manifested in CJs) into aggregate representations of the likelihood of success in 
experimental contexts ( Hertzog et al., 2008). Note that the collection of multiple judgments 
allowed for the examination of changes in monitoring accuracy both within and across two 
study-test phases. We hypothesized that changes in judgment accuracy would differ by test type, 
with the typical UWP for recall tests but not recognition tests. 
Second, we explored the effects of test type transfer (i.e., recognition to recall or recall to 
recognition) on item and global judgments. We hypothesized that individuals would fail to 
adequately adjust metacognitive judgments for transfer in test type. Specifically, we expected 
that individuals transferred from recognition tests to recall tests would provide phase 2 JOLs 
more consistent with their high level of phase 1 success in recognition performance and discount 
the recall test instruction, whereas individuals transferring from recall tests to recognition tests 
would provide phase 2 JOLs more consistent with their lower level of phase 1 success and 
discount the recognition test instruction. 
Methods  
Design 
To fully compare changes in monitoring accuracy with consistent test type versus test type 
transfer, this experiment involved a 2 (phase 1 test type) × 2 (phase 2 test type) × 2 (phase 1 or 2) 
mixed factorial design. This resulted in four testing conditions; each participant was tested in one 
of the following: (1) recognition then recall, (2) recall then recognition, (3) consistent 
recognition, or (4) consistent recall. Each participant completed two phases, and each phase 
consisted of a study segment and a test segment. As such, the procedure for each participant 
included study-test phase 1 followed by study-test phase 2, with the test types as indicated by 
condition labels. 
Participants 
One hundred adults between the ages of 18 and 25 years participated and received course credit 
as compensation for their time. Equal numbers of participants were randomly assigned to each 
testing condition, as described above. 
Procedure 
Stimulus presentations and response recordings were controlled by a Visual Basic 6.0 program. 
All participants completed self-paced computerized instructions. The participants were told they 
would perform multiple study-test phases for a set of 60 normatively unrelated word pairs (e.g., 
IVY-BIRD or CAT-MARKET), with 6 s of study per pair. This paired-associates learning task 
provides a simple analog to associative learning in the classroom, where assessment often 
requires the correct pairing of terminology with conceptual definitions. 
Importantly, the type of test to be completed (depending on condition and phase) was described 
in detailed instructions preceding each study-test phase. The instructions also presented sample 
test items for the test type to be completed. Participants were then asked to provide a Global 
PreStudy Prediction: The estimated number of word pairs out of sixty total pairs that they would 
be able to correctly recognize or recall at test. 
Following study of each word pair, an item JOL was requested (e.g., “How confident are you 
that you will be able to remember the previous word-pair 10 min from now? Please estimate your 
% confidence by typing in a number ranging from 0 to 100.”). Following study of all stimuli, 
participants were asked to provide a Global PostStudy Prediction analogous to the global 
prestudy prediction described above. 
Depending on condition and phase, recognition or recall tests followed. For recognition testing, 
participants were shown a pair and instructed to press a key labeled “Y” if the target pair 
matched what had been presented in study or a key labeled “N” if the target pair did not match. 
Thirty matched pairs and thirty unmatched pairs were randomly ordered during recognition 
testing. Matched pairs were exactly like those presented during study (e.g., IVY-BIRD) and 
unmatched pairs were generated by randomly selecting the second word from a pair other than 
the match (e.g., IVY-MARKET). For recall testing, the first word of the pair was presented and 
participants were required to type in the second word to complete the word pair (e.g., IVY-
__________). The first three letters of the word had to be entered correctly for the response to be 
scored as correct. 
Following each word pair test, an item CJ was requested (e.g., “How confident are you that your 
previous response was correct? Please estimate your % confidence by typing in a number 
ranging from 0 to 100.”). Following tests for all the 60 word pairs, participants were asked to 
provide a Global PostTest Postdiction estimating the number of pairs they had correctly 
recognized or recalled. 
Results  
We examined the following measures: Memory accuracy, item ratings (CJs and JOLs), and 
global ratings (predictions and postdictions). Item and global ratings were examined both in 
terms of response level and in terms of absolute accuracy (i.e., subtractions of accuracy from 
ratings). Item ratings were additionally examined in terms of relative accuracy (i.e., item-level 
discriminability as indexed by Goodman-Kruskal gamma correlations). 
Memory Accuracy 
Memory performance data are given in Figure 1 and Table 1. Because scaling differs for 
recognition accuracy and recall accuracy – with the functional floor for recognition higher than 
the floor for recall – differences in outcomes are described but not formally tested. As 
anticipated, performance was higher when performing recognition than when performing recall, 
regardless of whether the test type had been performed consistently or transferred. Anticipated 
performance improvements can also be seen for phase 2. Note that this pattern of outcomes 
results in a crossover interaction in the transfer conditions, with increasing accuracy when 
transferring from recall to recognition and decreasing accuracy when transferring from 
recognition to recall. Metacognitive ratings which accurately reflect memory performance should 
show a similar pattern with ratings driven by test type and learning and a crossover interaction in 
the transfer conditions. 
 
Figure 1. Mean values and standard errors of memory accuracy (top), CJs (middle), and JOLs 
(bottom) by phase and condition. Note that considerable overlap exists in the top panel. In phase 
1, both conditions performing recognition had accuracy near 80%, while both performing 
recognition had accuracy near 25%; in phase 2, both conditions performing recognition had 
accuracy near 90%. Overlapping points in the middle panel reflect analogous similarities. 
Table 1 has been omitted from this formatted document. 
Item Ratings 
CJs 
Figure 1 also shows the mean CJs for test conditions over phases. Note that the pattern of CJs 
was indeed similar to the pattern observed for mean levels of memory performance, with 
condition differences in each phase driven by test type and practice-based improvements, as well 
as the crossover interaction with transfer. Accordingly, the absolute accuracy of CJs (computed 
as a simple subtraction of accuracy from ratings) was quite good ( Figure 2), demonstrating that 
metacognitive ratings can track performance differences/changes by test type, training, and 
transfer. The relative accuracy of CJs was also generally high ( Table 2), particularly in the 
second phase. As noted earlier, test type differences in relative accuracy may be driven in large 
part by the possibility of correct guessing for recognition tests but not for recall tests ( Schwartz 
& Metcalfe, 1994; Thiede & Dunlosky, 1994; Weaver & Kelemen, 2003). 
 
Figure 2. Mean values and standard errors for absolute accuracy of CJs (accuracy; top) and 
JOLs (accuracy; bottom) by phase and condition. 
Table 2 is omitted from this formatted document. 
JOLs 
Mean JOLs and standard errors by phase and test type are shown in Figure 1. The 
correspondence between performance and CJ was not similarly reflected in JOLs. At phase 1, the 
test type difference, comparing those in the recall test conditions to those in the recognition test 
conditions, was small but reliable, F(1, 99) = 5.16, MSE = 372, p = .03. Note that the average 
JOL for the recognition conditions was below 40% – lower than a benchmark of 50% based on 
random guessing. Improvements from phase 1 to phase 2 were anticipated across conditions, F(1, 
96) = 62.09, MSE = 193, p < .01. It appears that the largest improvements were anticipated by 
participants performing consistent recognition. Indeed, phase 2 JOLs for consistent recognition 
were reliably higher than for each of the other groups (all p < .01), which did not differ (all p > 
.05), as indicated by examining all focused (pairwise) condition comparisons. Note that 
decreases in memory performance when transferring from recognition to recall testing were not 
reflected in JOL ratings, and participants who transferred from recognition to recall appeared to 
anticipate improved performance at phase 2 instead of the negative transfer effect. Individuals’ 
JOLs apparently did not consider the fact that recognition is substantially easier than recall. Note, 
however, that increases in JOL ratings were less pronounced for participants transferring from 
recognition to recall, compared to those performing consistent recognition, indicating some 
sensitivity to transfer, F(1, 48) = 6.90, MSE = 190, p = .01. 
The absolute accuracy of JOLs is given in Figure 2. At phase 1, groups performing recall showed 
good absolute accuracy while groups performing recognition showed pronounced 
underconfidence – an effect driven by differences in accuracy given the JOL similarity noted 
above, F(1, 98) = 115.07, MSE = 456, p < .01. Furthermore, groups performing recall at phase 1 
showed decreased absolute JOL accuracy at phase 2 (i.e., increased underconfidence – the UWP 
effect), while groups performing recognition at phase 1 showed increased absolute JOL accuracy 
at phase 2 (i.e., decreased underconfidence), F(1, 98) = 8.98, MSE = 613, p < .01. Earlier recall 
performance appeared to profoundly reduce absolute JOL accuracy by participants in the recall 
to recognition transfer condition. Focused comparisons at phase 2 (examining all pairwise 
condition comparisons) indicate that participants in the recall-then-recognition condition were 
more underconfident than other conditions (all p < .01), which did not differ in the absolute 
accuracy of their JOLs (all p > .05). This outcome appears to be driven by a failure to anticipate 
the substantial performance improvements afforded by the transfer to a recognition task. Relative 
accuracy was poorer for JOLs compared to CJs ( Table 2). As for CJs, relative JOL accuracy was 
higher for phase 2. 
In summary, item ratings indicate good absolute and relative accuracy for CJs but poorer 
monitoring for JOLs. These outcomes confirm previous findings that metacognitive monitoring 
during test, as a more proximal indicator of performance, is more accurate (also see Dunlosky & 
Hertzog, 2000; Thiede & Dunlosky, 1994). While the conditions with recall tests in phase 1 
showed a typical UWP outcome for JOLs, the conditions with recognition tests in phase 1 
showed an opposite outcome of initially pronounced underconfidence which partially resolved in 
phase 2. 
Global Ratings 
Global metacognitive ratings are given in Figure 3. Mean ratings for each condition are 
presented chronologically with test accuracy to allow for the comparison of changes in 
monitoring accuracy during and across phases. In phase 1, prestudy predictions were around or 
below 50% and did not vary reliably by test type (those performing recall compared to 
recognition), F(1, 98) = 1.69, MSE = 436, p > .05. For phase 1, note that although ratings 
universally drop from prestudy to poststudy, they increase from poststudy to posttest for groups 
performing recognition but decrease from poststudy to posttest for groups performing recall. 
These data will be examined below in the context of their absolute accuracy. 
 
The absolute accuracy of global metacognitive ratings is given in Figure 4. Patterns of accuracy 
by test type and transfer were qualitatively similar for prestudy and poststudy predictions and 
quite similar to patterns of absolute accuracy for JOLs, as follows (noted differences in these 
planned comparisons were reliable at p < .05). At phase 1, groups performing recall showed 
good absolute accuracy for predictions while groups performing recognition were substantially 
underconfident. At phase 2, groups performing recall at phase 1 showed increased 
underconfidence in predictions, while groups performing recognition at phase 1 showed stable or 
decreased underconfidence. In the group which transferred from recall to recognition, phase 1 
recall again seems to have markedly reduced phase 2 predictions relative to accuracy. As with 
CJs, posttest postdictions were less deviant from accuracy. However, phase 1 postdictions 
showed good absolute accuracy for recall but underconfidence for recognition, consistent with 
other global ratings and JOLs. 
 
Figure 4. Mean values and standard errors for absolute accuracy of PRS (accuracy; top), PSS 
(accuracy; middle), and PST (accuracy; bottom) by phase and condition. 
These outcomes aid interpretation of the mean global ratings in terms of how test type and 
transfer impact changes in monitoring accuracy. Participants who performed recall in phase 1 
show stable or increased underconfidence (the typical UWP effect) within phase 1 as well as 
across phases. In contrast, participants who performed recognition in phase 1 show decreased 
underconfidence within phase 1 as well as across phases. Likewise, decreased ratings from phase 
1 poststudy to posttest by participants performing recall reflects increased underconfidence (i.e., 
poorer absolute accuracy; again the typical UWP effect), whereas increased ratings from phase 1 
poststudy to posttest by participants performing recognition reflects decreased underconfidence 
(i.e., better absolute accuracy). 
However, comparison of phase 1 postdictions and phase 2 predictions reveals both test type and 
transfer effects. While participants performing consistent recognition show decreased ratings and 
those performing consistent recall do not show substantially increased ratings from phase 1 
posttest to phase 2 prestudy, participants transferring from recall to recognition do seem to 
anticipate better phase 2 performance and participants transferring from recognition to recall do 
seem to anticipate poorer phase 2 performance. Nevertheless, in neither case does the anticipated 
change account for the impact of test type on performance. It is also notable that the decrease in 
ratings from prestudy to poststudy in phase 1 did not occur in phase 2, where ratings increased 
from prestudy to poststudy and also to posttest (except for in the recognition to recall group), 
suggesting that the resolution of recall UWP begins within the second study-test phase rather 
than following it. 
In summary, absolute accuracy of global ratings was consistent with findings for item ratings. 
The UWP effect occurred within as well as between phases for those who performed recall tests 
in phase 1, while participants who performed recognition tests in phase 2 showed an opposite 
effect – decreased underconfidence – both within and across phases. While we obtained some 
evidence that participants considered test type and test transfer in comparisons between phase 1 
posttest and phase 2 pretest ratings, such considerations appear to be inadequate. 
Discussion  
Over two study-test phases, substantial differences in subjective learning were obtained for 
recognition versus recall testing, as demonstrated for both item and global judgments. Whereas 
consistent recall testing, as has been previously examined, produced UWP, a separate pattern 
emerged for recognition testing. Rather than being overconfident in phase 1 and underconfident 
in phase 2, recognition testing led to extreme underconfidence in phase 1 which diminished in 
phase 2. Given the mean levels of JOLs and global predictions, it appears that participants 
performing recognition did not consider that they had a substantial probability of correct 
guessing in a forced-response recognition task. 
A number of explanations for these findings can be considered. For the most part, metacognitive 
ratings appear to be driven by test type for the previous phase more so than by expectations of 
improved or reduced performance with learning or test type transfer. These patterns implicate a 
first possible explanation – that theory-based extrinsic cues are discounted or insufficiently 
considered when making metacognitive judgments ( Koriat, 1997; Koriat & Bjork, 2006). In this 
study, available extrinsic cues during both phases include anticipated test type (recall vs. 
recognition) as well as related beliefs regarding test difficulty. Thiede (1996) separated these 
factors and found that JOLs, self-regulation behaviors, and test performance were governed more 
so by test type compared to test difficulty, suggesting that participants either do not monitor or 
discount relative difficulty in favor of a priori beliefs about test type. Having obtained similar 
JOLs and predictions suggests that test type and difficulty expectations were not considered by 
participants in the current phase 1 with test type varied between subjects. Further research could 
separate these factors to determine the extent to which the discounting of a priori expectations 
about test type as well as previous test difficulty contribute to the insufficient sensitivity to test 
type transfer we observed in the current phase 2. 
Second, the outcomes could be explained by the possibility that subjective confidence in future 
success is not necessarily isomorphic with the objective aggregate likelihood of success (see 
Gigerenzer, 2000). JOLs and CJs require a subjective probability of success, scaled in % 
confidence, for each item. By contrast, performance in the recognition and recall memory tasks 
is scaled as % of items remembered, aggregated over the whole list. When asked to make JOLs 
for recognition judgments, individuals may use a subjective probability scale that does not align 
in an absolute sense with probability of correct recognition. Metacognitive researchers 
examining bias through absolute accuracy of item-level judgments implicitly assume these two 
probability scales align in interval-scale fashion, even though this is a major methodological 
assumption that is not necessarily correct (e.g., Keren, 1991). Arguing against this explanation, 
however, are the facts that (1) subjective confidence in CJs – in contrast to JOLs – aligns well 
with recognition probabilities and (2) our global predictions were scaled as the expected number 
(not the expected percentage) of correct items. Despite the differences in scaling, JOLs and 
global predictions behave quite similarly and show discounting of the cue of test type. We 
conclude that scaling effects cannot fully account for the results (see also Dougherty, Scheck, 
Nelson, & Narens, 2005). 
Future research might inform participants about the normative difficulty of the recognition and 
recall tests to see if this alters JOL rating behavior. Such a study could also manipulate whether 
restricting options on the subjective confidence scale (e.g., only allowing recognition test JOLs 
of 50–100% confidence to align with the probability of successful guessing) would influence the 
absolute accuracy of judgments in the recognition test. Future research should also more broadly 
consider whether, the extent to which, and how individuals correct monitoring judgments for 
guessing when anticipating recognition tests versus recall tests, and how such corrections might 
impact indices of monitoring accuracy. 
Third, outcomes are somewhat consistent with the MPT heuristic, advanced by Finn & Metcalfe 
(2007), which posits that JOLs are entrained by prior performance levels rather than by 
monitoring item study outcomes. By this account, participants increase phase 2 JOLs when they 
remember getting the item right on the phase 1 test, as is more likely with recognition, but 
decrease JOLs when they remember getting the item wrong on the phase 1 test, as more likely 
with recall. Certainly, postdictions were more accurate than predictions, indicating that people 
learn from test experience about their memory performance, even without performance feedback 
(see also Hertzog et al., 2008). 
To further consider the influence of the MPT heuristic on our findings, we directly compared 
accuracy data with global and item judgments (see Table 1). Marked changes in confidence 
occur during the study and test intervals as well as between the test and subsequent study. For 
example, confidence declined from prestudy predictions to JOLs in each condition during phase 
1 and increased in each condition during phase 2. For both phases and in each condition, global 
postdictions were below both previous response CJs and actual performance. Whereas 
comparison of absolute accuracy indicates that recall UWP resolves across phases, 
underconfidence also resolves during the study phase of the second study-test phase interval. 
Such outcomes do not directly follow from the MPT heuristic. Finn and Metcalfe (2007) also 
concluded that the MPT heuristic was not a sufficient account of UWP effects in consistent recall 
tasks, for different reasons. 
One method that has been used to demonstrate the MPT heuristic is the comparison of JOLs for 
items which were not recalled on a first test but recalled on a second test (FR or forgot-recalled 
items) to JOLs for items which were recalled on both a first and second test (RR items; see Finn 
& Metcalfe, 2007, 2008). If the MPT heuristic is being employed, JOLs in a second phase should 
be lower for items that were not recalled in the first test (FR items), regardless of test 2 recall 
(hence the comparison to RR items). We adopted this approach and compared the difference in 
phase 2 JOLS between FR and RR items for participants by condition (see Table 3). As predicted 
by the MPT heuristic, this difference was greater than zero in each condition (all p < .01). 
Furthermore, the size of the difference varied by condition. Whereas the difference was minimal 
for participants who completed a recognition test in phase 1, it was larger for those who 
completed a recall test in phase 1. It appears that recall test performance has a greater influence 
on subsequent ratings compared to recognition test performance. Further research should more 
closely examine potential sources of this discrepancy. 
Table 3 is omitted from this formatted document. 
In addition, comparisons of transfer and consistent conditions for the second study-test phase 
suggest that individuals raised their phase 2 predictions and JOLs well above phase 1 
postdictions when transferred to recognition memory, relative to those who continue recall 
testing. Conversely, individuals transferred to a recall test lower global predictions and JOLs 
more compared to those who will continue recognition. Thus, both item judgments and global 
judgments do appear to reflect changes in test type transfer in addition to any influence of past 
performance. 
Individuals’ metacognitive judgments were influenced by test type (e.g., Thiede, 1996), but not 
enough to produce high levels of absolute accuracy in JOLs and global predictions. Such 
findings are consistent with the argument that judgment accuracy is improved by task 
experience, but not in a manner completely consistent with the MPT heuristic. To the extent that 
previous performance influences subsequent metacognitive ratings, it appears to do so using 
what might be fallible monitoring of that previous performance (see Hines, Touron, & Hertzog, 
2009). Moreover, other factors seem to be in play as well. 
A limitation of this study is that recognition and recall tests do not have the same baseline of 
chance performance. The assumed base rate for guessing on our recall test is essentially zero, 
because there were few intrusion errors. Future research should compare recognition tests with 
varying numbers of response alternatives to characterize insensitivity to baseline performance 
more fully. It could also consider variants of forced recall tests (e.g., Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996) 
that might render the recall and recognition tests more comparable. Finally, manipulations that 
would reverse the performance advantage of recognition over recall would be useful to 
determine whether it is location in a range of the possible scale, rather than the nature of the 
memory test, that influences UWP differences (see Dougherty et al., 2005). Nevertheless, the 
present results are important because they open a new line of inquiry regarding test type effects 
and UWP. 
In summary, these outcomes further demonstrate that systematic distortions occur in the 
monitoring and forecasting of memory performance. Effects in the data show that sensitivity to 
the cue of test type, although present, is insufficient to maintain high levels of judgment accuracy 
when one is transferred to a new test type. Participants also largely discounted the impact of 
learning on test performance. Finally, participants’ failure to properly evaluate the differences in 
test type was sufficiently large that it overrode the UWP effect – which apparently is not 
universal, and could even be specific to the associative cued recall in which it was discovered. 
Whereas recall ratings became underconfident with practice, recognition ratings were highly 
underconfident initially, but this underconfidence decreased with recognition task practice. 
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